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Abstract
The recent ﬁnancial crisis in East Asia generated a revival of interest in the merits of ﬁnancial
openness. The ensuing debate on the beneﬁts of openness has focused more on short and
medium run issues than on the long run eﬀects. Within the empirical literature on economic
growth, little or no attention has been paid to the eﬀects of ﬁnancial openness. Contrary to
the orthodox position, the few results that exist suggest that capital controls have no eﬀect on
economic growth. This paper argues that this conclusion emerges from a failure to account for
underlying diﬀerences across countries with similar degrees of capital controls. Ishow that the
degree of ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity in a country plays a signiﬁcant role in explaining
the eﬀects of controls on economic growth. For countries with relatively higher degrees of
ethnic heterogeneity, the eﬀects are particularly adverse whereas for countries with high degrees
of homogeneity, capital controls actually have a net positive eﬀect on economic growth. On
balance, more developing countries suﬀered due to controls than not. Within the sample of 57
non OECD countries that did implement controls for the period 1975-95, as many as 39 saw a
reduction in their growth rates. This result is robust to a number of variables commonly used
in the economic growth regressions.
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11 Introduction
Market discipline is the best means the world has found to ensure that capital is well
used.
-Lawrence Summers (1998)
We have no evidence that it [capital account convertibility] solves any of our prob-
lems, and some reason to think that it may make them worse
-Dani Rodrik (1998)
The East Asian ﬁnancial crisis and the consequent conditionalities laid down by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund generated a heated debate between economists on the merits and demerits
of having an open capital account. Most of the debate has focused on short run issues and only a
few have taken the eﬀort to examine the long run eﬀects. The economic growth literature, which
has grown exponentially in the past decade, too has devoted little or no time on examining in
detail the empirical relationship between capital controls and economic growth. This is even more
surprising given the fairly large corpus of literature that now exists on international trade and
economic growth.
Within the scarce literature, Dani Rodrik’s ﬁnding that capital account openness generated no
obvious beneﬁt on long run growth, has attracted considerable attention amongst policy makers
and those involved in the openness debate.1 Based on a scatter plot of a measure of capital controls
and the growth rate between 1975-89, after controlling for the initial income per capita and a few
other variables, he clearly shows no perceptible correlation between the two. This has evoked sharp
responses from others. Jeﬀrey Frankel refers to Rodrik’s work as fail-safe econometrics: “The
secret of empirical work is to deﬁne your hypothesis so that failure to ﬁnd signiﬁcant results can
be interpreted as support.” 2 Eichengreen (1998) accuses those, who argue that today’s developing
countries should resist capital account liberalization of adopting a double standard. All developed
countries, he notes, opened their capital accounts- a logical culmination of the process of developing
a deep ﬁnancial system. While there might be valid arguments for developing countries to impose
capital controls as transitional measures there are none for permanently pursuing such a policy.
1See Rodrik (1998)
2See Eichengreen (1998).
2In defense of Rodrik, his results are in keeping with most of the preceding literature on capital
controls and economic growth. Earlier, Alesina, Grilli and Milessi Feretti (1994) found, for the
sample of OECD countries, that capital controls had positive but insigniﬁcant eﬀects on economic
growth. However, their study was based on annual data and therefore reﬂected short run eﬀects.
Grilli and Milessi Feretti (1995) reached a similar result for the sample of developing countries
based on growth over the medium run (ﬁve-year periods). The only contrary result comes from
Quinn (1997), who shows that capital account liberalization (and not openness per se) has had
positive eﬀects on economic growth.
The ﬁnding that capital controls seem to have had little or no eﬀect on economic growth
warrants further investigation. At the broadest level, capital controls can be viewed as a form of
government intervention. In search of the eﬀects of capital controls, a reasonable path to follow
would be to ﬁrst answer the question - what is it that allows some governments to undertake
successful interventions and not others? One of the strongest messages that permeate the economic
growth literature is the importance of having favorable conditions and institutions in place for
successful and sustained growth. Examples of such conditions include the beneﬁt of an ethnically
and linguistically homogenous society, a relatively equal distribution of income, high levels of human
capital, security of property rights, high social capital (based on subjective measures of trust and
civic norms) and social arrangements that aﬀect the incentive structure. 3 Pursuing policies that
artiﬁcially boost investment rates has not been suﬃcient to generate consistent increases in income
per capita. Further, there is increasing evidence that the direction of causality between investment
and growth may be from the latter to the former. Summers’ quote above notwithstanding, neither
does it seem to be true that the East Asian Miracle happened because of free markets. Rather
government intervention was pervasive, and in this they were aided by some of these favorable
conditions.4
In addressing the role of capital controls in economic growth, I pose the question: Is it that
3A sample of references include Easterly and Levine (1997) for ethno-lingustic fractionalization, Persson and
Tabellini (1994) for income distribution, Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) for human capital, Knack and Keefer (1995)
for property rights, Knack and Keefer (1997) for social capital and Temple and Johnson (1998) for social capability.
4See Wade (1990) for an extensive discussion. Rodrik (1995) also addresses the question of what allows governments
to get interventions right. He takes the case of two countries, South Korea and Taiwan (both of which incidentally had
high rates of growth but very diﬀerent policies in terms of capital openness). Both these countries, he argues, grew
rich not because of outward orientation but because their governments managed to engineer a signiﬁcant increase in
the private return to capital.
3the eﬀect (both direction and magnitude) of capital controls on economic growth is subject to
the underlying conditions and institutions that seem to be so important? By entertaining such a
hypothesis can one bring out the eﬀects of capital controls from hiding? In this paper, I assess
the importance of having an ethnically and linguistically homogenous society. Ishow that ethno-
linguistic homogeneity played a signiﬁcant role in complementing capital controls and allowed a
number of countries to have derive positive eﬀects from controls on growth. On the other hand,
countries with high degrees of heterogeneity experienced a decline in their growth rates because of
controls. It is not surprising then, that earlier papers ﬁnd no evidence of the eﬀect of controls on
growth. Simply entering capital controls as an independent variable in a growth regression is not
the best way to search for its eﬀects. In addition, I also brieﬂy explore the eﬀects of human capital
and income distribution. The results point in the same direction: Having higher levels of human
capital and a more equal income distribution help derive some positive eﬀects from controls but
the eﬀects are not as strong compared to the degree of homoegneity.
The argument that ethnic heterogeneity can have a negative eﬀect on capital controls is moti-
vated by the political economy literature on rent seeking and common pool problems. A general
reading of this literature suggests that for societies with a large number of distinct groups and
insecure property rights, interventions generate opportunities for excessive appropriative behavior
leading to ineﬃciencies.5 Being a government intervention, capital controls are also prone to this
problem. In countries with low capital labor ratios, though the marginal product of capital ought
to be relatively high, distortions in the form of taxation often reduces the net return. Taxation
may be necessary to ﬁnance public expenditures. If capital is mobile then such taxes will gener-
ate outﬂows and underinvestment in the economy. Usually it is more diﬃcult to tax capital that
earns returns abroad. Capital controls work not only to maintain the domestic tax base but simul-
5For example, Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997) show that separation of powers between distinct groups can
lead to common pool problems. Easterly and Levine (1997) use some of the arguments based on Shleifer and Vishny
(1993) to suggest that having more ethnic groups can result in greater bribe taking and also lead to each group
pursuing its own rent seeking policies independent of the actions of other groups. Not only does the existence of
more ethnic groups lead to higher rent seeking and corruption but it may also delay stabilization as suggested by
Alesina and Drazen (1991). Easterly and Levine have shown that high degrees of ethnic fragmentation go a long way
in explaining Sub-Saharan Africa’s poor growth performance. Mauro (1995) has already shown that high degrees of
ethnic fragmentation can lead to higher corruption. Tornell and Velasco (1992) present a model of capital ﬂight in
which groups prefer to invest abroad even though the domestic return is higher. This will happen if property rights
over the domestic investment is not well deﬁned and is subject to a common pool problem. They argue that capital
controls may not solve the problem but may make the situation worse, since openness implies an upper bound on
what groups are willing to appropriate domestically, as there is always the option to move capital out and earn a safe
return.
4taneously ensures domestic savings are indeed forced towards domestic investments. Under such
circumstances, though controls will reduce welfare they can be growth enhancing.
Even though governments preserve the tax base by enforcing controls, tax revenues may be
appropriated rather than put to their intended use. In most poor economies, where property rights
are not well deﬁned this is likely to be the case. If the economy is characterized by a large number
of groups the eﬀects will be worse since these groups fail to internalize the results of their actions.
For example, one can think of a situation where a government’s main source of revenue is through
taxation of production (or domestic capital). The government intends to use these revenues to
ﬁnance infrastructure, which beneﬁts all agents in the country. However if the control by the
government over the revenue is not complete, beneﬁciaries of the revenue will try and appropriate
more than what has been allocated to them. This leads to a tragedy of commons type of problem
where each group ﬁghts to maximize its own allocation but society suﬀers as a whole. In an economy
with a high degree of ethnic heterogeneity one might expect this kind of a situation to materialize.
Consequently, having a more divided society can choke the growth augmenting eﬀects of controls.
In addition to ethnic homogeneity, high levels of human capital stock relative to income and a
high degree of equality of wealth and income can also be expected to help government interventions
including capital controls work better. High levels of human capital imply the availability of a
skilled labor force that allows the formation of a competent bureaucracy. A high degree of income
inequality is symptomatic of an economy where powerful pressure groups, high degrees of social
polarization, and the possibilities of conﬂict exist. In such a scenario, interventionist policies
are required to undertake redistributive and more often than not, populist and growth retarding
policies. Moreover, governments placed in such a scenario have to devote resources to managing
conﬂicts and satisfying interest groups. This often comes at the cost of not being able to monitor
the bureaucracy. Based on these arguments, one can hope that higher levels of human capital
stock and more equal income distribution can mitigate some of the undesirable eﬀects of capital
controls. After looking at the eﬀects of ethnic heterogeneity, Itest for the roles of human capital
and equal income distribution in inﬂuencing the eﬀect of capital controls on growth. Compared
to the eﬀects of ethnic homogeneity, the beneﬁts of having high levels of human capital seem to
be less and suspect to robustness issues while income distribution empirically does not seem to
be important. Of course, these ﬁndings could be a consequence of the well known problem that
formal measures of human capital do not adequately reﬂect the true stock of human capital in an
5economy. Existing income distribution measures are even more vulnerable to data quality issues
and only a small number of countries actually have reliable data.
Though not discussed here, capital controls may aﬀect growth through a number of other
channels. Dooley (1995) presents an excellent survey of the theoretical and empirical literature.
Even if there is a theoretical case for capital controls to improve welfare and growth, the issue of
eﬀectiveness of controls needs to be addressed. In his reading of the empirical literature, Dooley
suggests that capital control programs in general have had measurable eﬀects on economic variables.
These programs have also generated large yield diﬀerentials but these tend to diminish over time
as the private sector invests in techniques to avoid controls. While many developing countries
are known to have put in place extensive capital controls over long periods of time, Dooley and
Mathieson (1994) ﬁnd that capital is quite mobile in these places. This ﬁnding is reinforced by
Johnston and Ryan (1994) who show that for a seven year period (1985-92), capital controls have
been less eﬀective in developing countries compared to developed ones. If controls are not eﬀective
enough for a seven year period, they are even less likely to be so for twenty years- the length
of time being studied in this paper. Finally, Edwards (1999) looks at the eﬀectiveness of capital
controls from a historical perspective. He suggests that controls on outﬂows have seldom worked.
To the contrary they have only introduced major distortions and bred corruption. Controls based
on inﬂows, such as in Chile, have worked in changing the composition of inﬂows towards those of
longer maturity but have not helped achieve monetary independence.
The next section of this paper presents a theoretical model which shows how controls and
polarization in society can interact to aﬀect economic growth. Section 2 discusses the data and the
empirical speciﬁcation. Section 3 presents the results and Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 A model
In this section I develop a highly stylized political economy model which shows how an increase
in the number of distinct groups in society aﬀects the inﬂuence of capital controls on domestic
production. The story is similar to the argument developed in the introduction. The government
imposes a tax on domestic capital to ﬁnance a public good which is used in private production.
For example, this may be some infrastructure such as roads or communication, or a service such
as the judiciary . Without the existence of this public good, private production cannot take place
6at all. However the possibility of taking capital out of the economy means that an alternative rate
of return can be earned abroad. All else being equal arbitrage conditions imply that capital will
ﬂow abroad until the domestic post taxation rate of return is equal to the net international rate of
return. To restrict the amount of capital that does ﬂow out, the government also imposes capital
controls which serves to lower the rate of return from international investments. However there is
also a problem of ill deﬁned property rights over the government revenue pool. This means that
each group has an incentive to appropriate some of the revenue. Appropriation here is amenable
to diﬀerent interpretations. It can mean that each group evades taxes or it can mean that each
group can recapture some of the amount that it paid as tax through a costless bribe. Since distinct
groups in society do not internalize the eﬀects of their appropriation, a tragedy of the commons
problem develops- there is too much appropriation. This reduces the amount of public good that is
eventually available to complement private production. As the number of groups increase in society
this problem tends to get aggravated. To keep the model simple, government policy (i.e. the level
of taxation and the degree of controls) is assumed to be exogenous and Ihave abstracted from the
question of eﬀectiveness of controls.
Consider a small open economy that faces a net world interest rate after capital controls. The
degree of capital controls is measured by a parameter that aﬀects the net world interest rate
negatively i.e.:
r = r(z)( r (z) < 0)
where z represents this degree of capital controls. If there were no capital controls, r(0) = r∗,
where r∗ is the ﬁxed world interest rate.
The economy’s population is assumed to be normalized to 1 and is divided into n equal groups.
For simplicity it is assumed that all groups are initially endowed with the same amount of wealth,
wi = W0/n, where i(= 1..n) represents a group, W0 represents the economy wide initial endowment.
There are three factors of production in this model: private capital stock, a public good ﬁnanced
through taxes on capital and labor.6 The tax rate is given by τ<1.
The way the game is played out is as follows: The decision maker in this economy is a group.7
There are two periods. Given an initial endowment of wi in the ﬁrst period, each group decides how
6An almost similar production structure is adopted in Barro (1990) except that output is taxed and not capital.
7Since the model builds upon the assumption that competing interest groups will want to appropriate government
revenues to further their own interests, it is more convenient to view a group as an optimizing agent as well.
7much to invest domestically and how much to invest abroad. In the second period given their capital
stock and the tax rate, each group decides how much to appropriate. Whatever is appropriated
is rolled back into group production. In deciding their strategies each group takes the strategy
of other groups as given. The model and its assumptions are very similar to Tornell and Velasco
(1992). Also strategies are assumed to be symmetric and linear. This is a useful assumption since
otherwise one needs to solve ﬁrst order conditions which involve partial derivatives of the unknown
strategies of the other players making the problem more complex.





t+1 is the amount of group production that takes place in the second period and di
t+1 is










where 0 <β<1, 0 <γ<1,γ +β<1. This means that production exhibits increasing returns
to scale in the three factors, but diminishing marginal returns to capital (public and private) and
labor. The assumption of increasing returns (and the very speciﬁc nature of the exponent of labor)
is necessary to rule out the possibility that simply dividing the population into more groups can
lead to a change in the aggregate output level.










where kt+1 is the capital stock of each group. Further capital stock in period t + 1 is equal to
portion of wealth in the period t allocated to domestic investmentst,
kt+1 = st
di
t+1, the income from investment abroad is given by,
8di
t+1 = dt+1 = r(z)(w − st)
The ﬁrst equality reﬂects the fact that all groups invest the same amount abroad and therefore
get the same gross return. So far Ihave not incorporated appropriation. The assumption of
symmetry and linearity means that in equilibrium each group appropriates, xi
t+1, which will be a
fraction of the government revenue,
xi
t+1 = αGt+1 (0 <α<1)
Since each group takes the strategies of other groups as given, the production function from the











This means that each group appropriates an amount xi
t+1 given that each of the other n − 1
groups appropriate αGt+1. Of course, as mentioned earlier, in equilibrium all groups appropriate
the same share. Given the structure, the solution is derived through backward induction. First the
optimal level of appropriation, xi
t+1 is derived given any level of group capital stock. Then, given
the optimal level of xi
t+1, the optimal allocation of initial wealth between domestic investment and
foreign investment is derived. Due to the restriction that optimal strategies are linear functions of
the government revenue, this two step method can actually be solved simultaneously. However I
will follow the two step method for clarity.
After undertaking relevant substitutions, each group’s maximization problem becomes8





(Gt+1(1 − α(n − 1) − xt+1)γ((1 − τ)kt+1 + αGt+1)β
+ r(z)(w − kt+1)

(3)




8All superscripts are dropped from here on.
9for given kt+1. This implies
γ[(1 − τ)kt+1 + xt+1]=β(Gt+1(1 − α(n − 1) − xt+1)
Using the linearity restriction, xi
t+1 = αGt+1, this becomes
γ[(1 − τ)kt+1 + αGt+1]=βGt+1(1 − αn)
Substituting Gt+1 = nτkt+1,Ig e t ,
γ[(1 − τ)kt+1 + αnτkt+1]=βnτkt+1(1 − αn)
After some rearrangement this gives us the optimal value of the fraction that each group ap-










This means that group i appropriates an amount:
xi














The above expression implies that the total fraction of government revenue appropriated by
all groups combined increases as the number of groups increase.9 As the number of groups rise,
the total amount of goverment revenue does not change since that is simply nkt+1 which is ﬁxed.
Putting it another way -while n increases, kt+1 falls since the initial endowment is now divided
across more groups and the product of the two remains unchanged. Faced with a lower private
capital stock, it becomes more attractive for groups to steal from the common pool. Since groups
do not internalize the eﬀects of their appropriation, all groups appropriate more individually.








t+1. If the degree of capital controls were so high that in eﬀect the economy becomes a closed
economy, then this condition is not operative. In that case the optimal appropriation amount is
still described by α∗ in equation (5) and the private capital stock per groups is simply the initial
endowment wi. More loosely, the optimization solution below applies for all z<z c, where zc is the
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where α∗ is the optimal value as derived above.
After substituting the optimal values of kt+1 and xt+1 in equation (2) and rearranging, the total


















The above expression is for group output. What is of interest, is the aggregate production in
the economy, nyt+1. This turns out to be,

















One can now study the eﬀects of capital controls and ethno-linguistic heterogeneity in the
economy. From equation (9) above, one can make the following proposition:




























11In this model, increases in capital controls have clear positive eﬀects on economic growth. This
is true despite appropriation, because whatever the group steals is rolled back into its production.
There could be alternative scenarios, where whatever is stolen is deposited in foreign banks or
“hoarded” and does not enter national income but enters utility directly. The eﬀects of capital
controls on output then might be negative. The point of this paper is not to take an ap r i o r i
stand on the direction in which capital controls work and then to show that the same holds true
empirically. Rather, the aim is to suggest that the eﬀects are less beneﬁcial if there is increased
heterogeneity in society. In other words what is of interest is the sign of
∂2Yt+1
∂z∂n . Further, though
capital controls lead to a higher domestic production, they do reduce welfare.
Proposition 2.2 An increase in n, the number of groups in society reduces the beneﬁcial eﬀects






























This is not a very surprising result. Proposition 2.1 suggests that as capital controls increase,
domestic production goes up. The reason this happens is because the traditional capital controls
argument is at work- higher capital controls lead to greater retention of domestic capital thus
leading to higher domestic capital stock. Higher levels of domestic capital stock given a ﬁxed tax
rate further means that there is a greater amount of government revenue. Together these imply a
greater amount of domestic production. However, equation (6) shows that as the number of groups
increase in society the fraction of government revenue that is appropriated increases and this is
independent of the amount of capital stock in the economy. This eﬀect of increased appropriation
from government revenues tends to diminish the positive eﬀects of capital controls. Though the
amount that is appropriated is rolled back into private production, it is not enough to compensate
for the decrease that takes place. This is because of the fact that what is being stolen would
otherwise have become a public good complementing private capital. Since each group steals a
fraction α∗, it experiences a decline of a fraction α ∗ n in the public good input. However each of
them can only put back α∗ <α∗ n into private capital. The net eﬀect is to reduce each group’s
output as n increases. This results portrays, albeit in a very simpliﬁed manner, the problem of
12having too many competing groups where they fail to internalize the eﬀects of their appropriation
strategies.
3 Model Speciﬁcation and Description of the Data
The empirical exercise seeks to answer two questions: a) Do capital controls have any eﬀect on
economic growth? b) Are these eﬀects inﬂuenced by the degree of ethnic homogeneity in a country?
The model outlined above is a static one (though, with some exogenous technological change or
adjustment costs one could easilly obtain dynamic versions) and in keeping with that one needs
an empirical speciﬁcation that tries to capture transitional eﬀects rather than steady state eﬀects.
Based on the existing practice in the growth literature, the ﬁrst question is then addressed by
estimating equations of the following variety
gi = a + byYi + B 
xXi + bcCi + ei
where i indexes countries, gi is the average growth rate of per capita income (GDP per capita)
for the period being investigated, yi is the logarithm of the initial GDP per capita, Xi is vector of
other variables that are believed to aﬀect the growth rate in transition to the steady state and Ci
is the capital control index. The speciﬁcation here attempts at being as close as possible to Rodrik
(1998) and therefore includes in Xi, a schooling variable, an indicator of institutional quality, and
dummy variables for East Asia, Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. The list is later extended
to include other variables to test for robustness.
To address the second question, based on the model above, another variable is added which is
the interaction between capital controls and ethnic homogeneity: Ci × Ei where Ei is the measure
of ethnic homogeneity. To ensure that this interaction term does not proxy for ethnic homogeneity
per se, Ei is also added to the list of independent variables. Thus empirical speciﬁcation is now,
gi = a + byYi + B 
xXi + bcCi + bceCi × Ei + beEi + ei
The measure of institutional quality that is used here is from the International Country Risk
Guide published annually by Political Risk Services. The variable was introduced into the literature
by Knack and Keefer (1995) and has been found to be a better indicator of the impact of property
rights on economic growth than measures such as revolutions, coups, assassinations, etc. Further
the model in section 2 does not account for the fact that changes in the level of enforceability
13of property rights can lead to changes in the optimal appropriation amount. So at least such
diﬀerences should be controlled for in the empirical speciﬁcation. The ethno-linguistic homogeneity
(ELH) measure used here is equal to one minus the ethno-linguistic fractionalization index, AVELF
(ELH=1-AVELF), variable used in Easterly and Levine (1997). For the growth rate in GDP, and
Real GDP per capita, the data was taken from the World Bank’s Global Development Network
Growth Database. The education variable used here is the average years of secondary schooling for
the period 1975-95.10
Those familiar with the empirical literature are only too aware of the limitations of the data
on capital controls. Unlike the variety of indices that are readily available or have been created
to measure openness in international trade, there is only one widely used variable for ﬁnancial
openness.11 The IMF’s annual publication, Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions,
has, since 1967, included a table that lists whether each country had in place various restrictions on
exchange rates and payments on international transactions. The table also lists whether countries
had restrictions on payments for capital transactions. The limitation is that this entry is completely
binary. Countries are either deemed to have controls in place or they are not.12 The obvious
drawback of such data is that there is no indication of the degree of capital controls making it
diﬃcult to extract much information. Further there is no way one can distinguish between various
types of capital controls. For example, one cannot distinguish between controls which some may
consider desirable, such as those on short-term ﬂows and those which may not be so, such as on
foreign direct investment. Finally, there is no way to distinguish between restrictions on inﬂows
and outﬂows. More recent issues of the same publication, beginning from 1996, carry a more
disaggregated analysis of restrictions on capital transactions. While empirical analysis with the
newer data set has begun to appear (see Johnston and Tamirisia (1998)), the span is much too
short for any long run study.
The index of capital controls that Iconstruct is a share based on the crude measure that is
10Originally introduced in Barro and Lee (1993), the data here is the updated version downloaded from
http://www.cid.harvard.edu.
11Though the adequacy of these trade openness indices has recently been put to doubt by Rodrik and Rodriguez
(1999).
12Other measures of capital mobility based on oﬀshore interest rate diﬀerentials, black market premium and
deviations from covered interest rate parity exist. However these measures are more endogenous rather than an
explicit indication of policy.
14available. A dummy variable is created with a country that had capital controls in place in a given
year taking the value 1, and if it had no capital controls in place, taking the value 0. Then for
the period of study (1975-95), the capital control index is calculated by dividing the number of
years it had controls in place by the length of that period. This is, in principle, the same measure
constructed by Rodrik (1999) and Klein and Olivei (1999). In order to maximize the number of
countries in the sample, any country that has a dummy variable for more than 16 years (80%) was
included. Clearly this is an imperfect measure of capital controls but seemingly one of the few
options that are available. In the rest of the paper this index is referred to as CAPCON1.
In order to corroborate the results, I also used a similar variable published by the Fraser Insti-
tute in its Economic Freedom of the World: 2000 Annual Report.13 The aim of the report “is to
construct an indicator of economic freedom of nations around the world...The goal is to develop an
objective measure of economic freedom rather than an index based on subjective assessments and
judgement calls.” The index is composed of seven sub-indices reﬂecting institutional arrangements
and policies in major areas. The fourth such sub-index is the freedom to use alternative currencies.
This index itself receives a weight of 14.6% in the ﬁnal index based on principal component analysis.
The ratings for freedom to use alternative currencies is further built on two other indices labeled
“4A” and “4B” each having a 50% weight. The index under label 4A measures the freedom of
citizens to own foreign currency bank accounts domestically and abroad. Index 4B measures the
“Diﬀerence between the Oﬃcial Exchange Rate and the Black Market Rate”. Since the latter is
similar to the black market premium used commonly in the growth literature, Ileft it out of the
analysis. The former is based on information gathered from Currency Data and Intelligence Inc.,
World Currency Yearbooks (various issues) and the IMF Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions (various issues). When foreign currency bank accounts were permissible without re-
strictions both domestically and abroad, the rating was 10. When these accounts were restricted,
the rating was zero. If foreign currency bank accounts were permissible domestically but not al-
lowed abroad (or vice versa), the rating is 5. The data for this index is available quinquennially
beginning from 1970. However there is a jump in the sample size from 1975 onwards. Though the
index is not a considerable improvement over the share variable, nevertheless Iused it to reconﬁrm
the results. In the rest of the paper this index is labelled CAPCON2.
13See Gwartney, Lawson and Samida (2000).
15It is instructive to see how both CAPCON1 and CAPCON2 have behaved over the past decades.
Figure 1A charts the movement of capital controls over ﬁve year periods beginning with 1976. Out of
a total of 111 countries, only 17 had no capital controls at all during 1976-80. These countries were
Belgium, Bolivia, Canada, Germany, Honduras, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia,
Mexico, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, Saudi Arabia, United States and Venezuela.
There were as many as 87 countries with a CAPCON1 value of 1 during the same period. A
look at the graph shows in general the sample is mostly described by values of 0.8 or higher with
very little variation. Though the sample of countries for which IMF has data increases to 157 in
the period 1991-95, the description in terms of the values CAPCON1 takes remains pretty much
the same. The number of countries with no capital controls rises to 29 while the number with a
CAPCON1 value of 1 is now as high as 112. In percentage terms the number of countries with a
value of 1 drops from 78% to 71%.
Figure 1B gives an idea of how the index CAPCON2 moves over the period 1975-1995. If the
phenomenon of “globalization” was not apparent from the graphs in ﬁgure 1, it clearly does here.
In 1975, almost half of the sample have a value equal to 1. A signiﬁcant change occurs as we move
from 1985 to 1990. For the latter year, about only half have a value of 1. By the time one reaches
1995, as much as two-thirds of the sample do not have a value of one and as many as 40% have
a value of zero. Table 1 presents the correlations between the two variables. Both variables have
a reasonably high correlation over time with the correlations being lower the further the variables
are placed from each other in terms of the period of measurement. For the entire period, 1975-95,
the correlation between the two indices is fairly high at 0.73. Even if all the OECD countries are
dropped, the correlation remains more or less unchanged.
In order to further check the relevancy of these measures, I also looked at their correlations
with actual magnitudes of movements of capitals across borders. Table 2 looks at some numbers
from balance of payments data. The table includes foreign direct investment inﬂows, FDIoutﬂows,
portfolio capital inﬂows, portfolio capital outﬂows, gross private capital ﬂows, the ﬁnancial account
balance and the current account balance - all as a share of GDP.14 The correlations are listed for all
14Data for these come from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) and the World Bank Indicators (WBI).
Portfolio capital inﬂows and outﬂows are respectively what the IFS more precisely calls Portfolio Investment Liabilities
and Portfolio Investment Assets (note that any capital inﬂow is a liability for the recipient country). The ﬁnancial
account balance in the IFS is the sum of the balance of direct investment (mostly FDI), portfolio investment, other
investment transactions and ﬁnancial derivatives. Gross private capital ﬂows (taken from WBI) are the sum of the
absolute values of direct, portfolio, and other investment inﬂows and outﬂows recorded in the balance of payments
16countries and for the restricted sample of non OECD countries. In terms of foreign direct investment
it is clear that both inﬂows and outﬂows were signiﬁcantly lower because of capital controls. As far
as portfolio investment ﬂows go there is strong evidence that capital controls restricted inﬂows but
there is no evidence that outﬂows were restricted for non-OECD countries. This lack of correlation
does not necessarilly imply that there were no controls on outﬂows. It is possible that countries
which did not have controls simply did not experience large scale outﬂows while countries that did
have controls by deﬁnition would not experience outﬂows as well. Further it is well known that if
there are controls on outﬂows, it ends up being an implicit control on inﬂows as well. Therefore
it is not surprising that more capital controls are associated with signiﬁcantly lower inﬂows. This
lack of correlation also shows up in the ﬁnancial balance but that is less surprising. Even if one
restricted attention simply to FDI, the fact that both inﬂows and outﬂows were lower because of
controls means that the net balance may very well be uncorrelated with controls. Gross capital
ﬂows, on the other hand is clearly lower. Finally countries that did impose controls also had lower
current account balances. Theoretically this would imply a net inﬂow of capital into the economy,
suggesting that the restriction were on outﬂows and not on inﬂows. However care should be taken
when making such a conclusion since the adjustment need not be taking place only on the ﬁnancial
account but could also be borne by drawing down on reserves.
4 Growth Regressions
The correlation between the growth rate for the period 1975-95 and the capital controls indices
are -0.30 for CAPCON (Based on the maximum sample of 82 countries used in this study) and
-0.25 for CAPCON2 (Based on a maximum sample of 82 countries). Though not particularly
high they are indicative of some degree of a negative association. A simple regression of the
growth rate on CAPCON1 after controlling for the initial income per capita produces a coeﬃcient
of -1.11- statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level. CAPCON2 also has a negative sign but the
coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant. In Table 3, results similar to the regression carried out by Rodrik
are presented. Columns (3) and (4) reproduce the results using the same speciﬁcation for all
countries. The independent variables include the log of initial GDP per capita, average years of
secondary schooling for the period 1975-95 (SYR7595), an institutional quality measure (INSTTN)
ﬁnancial account, excluding changes in the assets and liabilities of monetary authorities and general government.
Current account balance (WBI) is the sum of net exports of goods, services, net income, and net current transfers.
17and regional dummies for East Asia, Latin America and Sub Saharan Africa. Columns (5) and (6)
repeat the results with only non-OECD countries included in the sample. If there is any inﬂuence
of capital controls on economic growth, it is not apparent here. In fact in the regressions that
include all countries, it is the only variable that is not of any importance.15
As argued in section 2, the eﬀects of capital controls on economic growth is a negative function
of the number of appropriative groups that exist in society. The index of ethno-linguistic frac-
tionalization popularized by Easterly and Levine (1997) is one rough measure of such division in
society. Of course, it is not a suﬃcient measure of such groupism. It is possible that countries may
have high degrees of ethnic plurality and yet be more uniﬁed than countries which are ethnically
homogenous. However given that this is the only measure that has been shown empirically to
have a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on economic growth, it is the one Iadopt. Columns (1) and (2)
in Table 4 add the ethnic homogeneity indicator to the list of independent variables. The strong
positive eﬀects of homogeneity found be Easterly and Levine (1997) are clearly reproduced here.
Both capital control variables still do not show any signiﬁcant eﬀect. In keeping with the results
of the theoretical section, one needs to add an interaction term to the speciﬁcation. Columns (3)
and (4) add the terms ELH×CAPCON1 and ELH×CAPCON2 to the speciﬁcation in Column (1)
and Column (2). The change in the direct eﬀects of capital controls are nothing if not dramatic.
CAPCON1 now is signiﬁcant at the 5% level and CAPCON2 does even better being signiﬁcant
at 1%. Since a lot of the variation in the data on controls can be attributed to OECD countries,
Columns (4) and (5) repeat the results with those countries dropped. Again both indicators retain
their strong signiﬁcance. Finally Idropped Hong Kong and Taiwan from the sample as both of
them were very high growth countries that have values of zero for CAPCON1 and CAPCON2.
Results (5) and (6) clearly suggest that two countries are not driving the results. In addition to
the CAPCON variables, the model in the earlier sections suggests that the interaction term should
be signiﬁcant. Indeed, in each of the results in Table 4 where it has been included, it is strongly
signiﬁcant.
A cursory look at the coeﬃcients of CAPCON1 (and CAPCON2) and the respective interaction
terms suggest that within countries that imposed complete capital controls, those with complete
ethnic homogeneity (ELH=1) were in a position to oﬀset the negative eﬀects of capital controls. For
15The OECD countries for this paper are the “older” set and do not include newer members such as Mexico and
Korea.
18example, a country with complete homogeneity could move from complete openness
to being completely closed and experience an absolute increase of 0.78% in its annual
growth rate. Alternatively, if a country that was completely heterogenous (ELH=0)
moved from being open to closed, it would experience a decrease of 3.77% in its annual
growth rate. No country of course has complete heterogeneity. Looking at speciﬁc countries, as
many as 34 countries managed to more than oﬀset the pure negative eﬀects of capital controls and
had a net positive eﬀect because of relatively high degrees of ethnic homogeneity. Of this 18 were
non OECD countries. Of course this list does not include countries that were completely open (The
sum of their coeﬃcients for CAPCON and CAPCON×ELH is trivially zero). On the other hand
as many as 39 developong countries suﬀered due to capital controls.
Table 5 lists the top ten developing countries that managed to derive a positive eﬀect. Amongst
developing countries that had a measure of CAPCON1 equal to 1, those emerging at the top of
the list include Bangladesh, Korea, Dominican Republic, Jamiaca and Egypt. Not one of the sub-
saharan African countries make it to the list. In fact, no sub-saharan African country derived a
positive eﬀect from capital controls. Easterly and Levine (1997) noted that the ethno-linguistic
heterogeneity particularly adverse eﬀects in the same region. These results reinforce their ﬁndings.
Looking at negative eﬀects of capital controls, a total of 40 countries ended up with an overall
negative eﬀect on economic growth. Table 4 shows that the ten worst aﬀected were all sub-Saharan
African countries. Included in the 40 are also the remaining South Asian countries -India, Pakistan
and Sri Lanka. The only high income country in this group of 40 is Spain. Relatively similar results
emerge when using CAPCON2. With CAPCON2, 31 countries managed to oﬀset the negative eﬀect
while 34 countries experienced a net positive eﬀect. The results were also checked for robustness
with the 1960 measure of ethno-lingusitic homogeneity (ETHNIC in Easterly and Levine(1997)).
Not surprisingly, the ETHNIC measure does much better when regressions were run for the 1967-95
period (i.e. the entire period for which information on capital restrictions (CAPCON1) is available
from the IMF).
Another interesting observation one can make from the table is that the coeﬃcient of ethnic
homogeneity is now negative. This is in contrast to the results suggesting that ethnic diversity is
bad for economic growth as in Easterly and Levine (1997). Though they tried to search for a non-
linear relationship between their ETHNIC measure and growth, they were unable to do so. The
results here suggest that having higher degrees of ethnic fragmentation is bad when economies are
19completely open (since CAPCON is zero and the interaction term is also zero). Though this might
seem strange at ﬁrst sight, Tornell and Velasco (1992) have proposed this possibility. They show
that in an open economy the individual appropriation rate must be lower in order to ensure that
the domestic rate of return and the foreign one remain equal. However more groups appropriate
from the same pie leading to a situation where economies with more interest groups will have a
greater growth rate and less capital ﬂight. Of course this argument is subject to the condition
that poor property rights characterize the economy, which is not true of all economies that are
completely open and have high degrees of ethnic homogeneity. An alternative intepretation could
be that since most of these open countries are high income countries, the negative eﬀects of such
division are less or completely absent when the level of development is higher.
Figures 2 and 3 show scatterplots of the component of growth predicted by capital controls
and the interaction of capital controls with ethnic homogeneity. On the basis of Column (3) in
Table 4, the horizontal axis in ﬁgure 2 is therefore -3.77*CAPCON1 +4.45(CAPCON1×ELH).
The vertical axis is of course the actual growth rate during the same period. The plot suggests a
positive relationship with some interesting features. First, almost all OECD countries are cluttered
at or around the predicted value of 0 in both ﬁgure. This is to be expected since most of them had
approximately azero value of capital controls through the entire period. Looking at both the ﬁgures
one clearly sees the so called “gang of four” East Asian nations (Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and
Taiwan) are grouped at the top right hand corner with Korea being placed at the extreme. The
problem of the gang of four in growth regressions has been discussed earlier in Easterly (1995). To
ensure the results are robust, Ire-estimated the model but dropped these four nations from the
sample. The results are reproduced in Columns (1) of Tables 6A and 6B. Again Capital Controls
has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect while the interaction term has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on growth.
Since Levine and Renelt (1992), there has been a growing awareness of the problem of robustness
of growth regressions. Table 3 already included a fair number of important variables against which
many so called determinants of growth fail. In particular continental dummies tend to reduce the
signiﬁcance of a number of determinants of growth considerably. However the capital controls story
is not aﬀected by these variables. Tables 6A and 6B present some further robustness results. For all
these regressions the gang of four was dropped to rule out their role in driving the results. The ﬁrst
column of both tables include the log of the investment ratio. This variable is one of the few that is
consistently signiﬁcant in the multitude of growth regressions that now exist in the literature. Its
20inclusion tends to diminish the signiﬁcance of the interaction term in the case of CAPCON1 but
does not aﬀect the same for CAPCON2. The two capital control variables entered independently
continue to remain signiﬁcant.16 The second column included two variables, the inﬂation rate for
1975-95 and life expectancy in 1975.17 The inﬂation rate is included simply as an indicator of the
macroeconomic siuation in the country, while the life expectancy variable is included as an indicator
of non educational human capital. Further the latter was one of the few variables found consistently
robust in the million regressions run in Sala-i-Martin (1997). Column (3) includes two indicators of
political freedom in a country- the Gastil indices of political rights and civil liberties (both averaged
for the 1975-95 period) published by Freedom House.18 Column (4) includes a measure of openness
in international trade- the volume of exports plus imports as a share of output (TRADEVOL) for
the 1975-95 . CAPCON1 and the volume of trade index have a negative correlation of -0.28 for the
sample of countries for which data is available. Further the latter index has a positive correlation
of similar magnitude with the growth rate. There has been growing acceptance that well developed
ﬁnancial institutions are important in promoting economic growth in a country. King and Levine
(1993) provide convincing evidence using a number of ﬁnancial development indicators. Column (6)
shows the robustness with respect to one of these indicators, LLY7590, the ratio of liquid liabilities
to GDP. The variable itself has very little signiﬁcance and does not aﬀect the performance of capital
controls.19
As argued earlier, the importance of ethno-linguistic homogeneity in growth might itself be a
function of the level of development. At higher levels of development homogeneity might be less
important. Further capital controls itself might be a negatively correlated with function of income
per capita. Under such circumstances it is possible that the interaction between capital controls
and homogeneity is really a measure of the interaction between income per capita and homogeneity.
Another problem is the correlation between capital controls and institutional quality. If one looks at
Table 5 which lists the countries that were worst hit by controls, one observes that these countries
are in general, ones that are likely to rank low in terms of institutional quality. This suggests that
16All the robustness regressions and the regression presented in earlier tables were carried out with the investment
ratio, and the results remain unchanged
17The inﬂation rate measure used here is the GDPdeﬂator.
18The data can be downloaded from http://www.freedomhouse.org
19The regression was repeated with the three other indicators of ﬁnancial development used in King and Levine
(1993). While the indicators themselves varied in signiﬁcance they had no eﬀect on the importance of capital controls.
21capital controls might be acting as a proxy for bad institutional quality. In fact, Easterly (2000)
suggests that ethnic fragmentation might be less of a problem in economies with better institutions.
To address these issues, column 6 in Tables 6A and 6B add interaction terms between homogeneity
and a) income per capita and b) institutional quality . These do not aﬀect the result on capital
controls and economic growth. Column 7 drops all OECD countries in addition to the East Asian
tigers. Though the sample size falls drastically, the results are still very strong.20
All these results suggest convincingly that indeed having an ethnically heterogenous society
may have actually led capital controls to have adverse eﬀects on economic growth. There are issues
of endogeneity that Ihave not considered here. However, that is less likely to be a problem. One
reason the whole exercise was undertaken was because of the observation that growth and capital
controls do not have a direct signiﬁcant correlation. Therefore the notion that capital controls
were less in countries with higher growth rates is not a relationship that should pose a problem for
the inferences arrived at here. Ethno-linguistic division is also one of the few variables that can
legitimately be considered exogenous in growth regressions.21
4.1 Of Human Capital and Income Distribution
Countries with higher levels of human capital stock may beneﬁt from having a more competent
bureaucracy which can help in better policy implementation. Higher levels of human capital also
means relatively higher returns to labor. One may then conjecture that in such an economy, the
population can engage in more productive activities and the incentive to resort to rent seeking and
appropriation might be lower.22. Further, the fact that a country has managed to achieve higher
educational attainments can also itself be an indication that policy making is more successful. The
fact that the correlation between average years of secondary schooling for 1975-95 (SYR7595) and
ethno-linguistic homogeneity (ELH) is 0.46 for the 82 countries that were used in Table 4 lends
some support to some of the arguments. This suggests that having higher human capital stock can
20A number of additional robustness exercises were conducted. These included estimating a SUR model with two
periods (75-85, 85-95) and repeating everything shown in the tables, extending the time period further back to 1967
for CAPCON1, dropping all OECD countries for each of the results displayed,etc. These are all available upon
request.
21However some additional estimation exercises were performed using lagged restrictions on current account and
capital account as instruments. Klein and Olivei (1999) also suggest the use of a regrouping of continental dummies
as instruments for controls. The results with all these instruments continued to be robust.
22This does not imply that countries with higher levels of human capital have less corrupt bureaucracies!
22also ensure that the negative eﬀects of capital controls might be lower. Table 7A and 7B presents
some results for education and capital controls. The education measure used here is the same as
in the early regressions, the average years of secondary schooling in population aged 15 and above
for the period 1975-95. While there is some indication that human capital also might play a role in
inﬂuencing the eﬀects of controls, a look at the results suggest that the robustness of the inﬂuence
is susceptible to sample size and control issues. Of course, it is possible that, as mentioned earlier,
this is simply because formal measures of education do not capture well the contribution of human
capital. Using the coeﬃcients of Column (1) in Table 7A, as done with ethnic homogeneity, one
can calculate the net eﬀect of capital controls. It turns out that none of the developing countries in
the sample had a level of human capital high enough to have a net positive eﬀect on growth despite
having capital controls. The country coming closest is Trinidad and Tobago which experienced a
net reduction of 0.79% in its annual growth rate.23
Lower levels of income inequality can also have beneﬁcial eﬀects on government intervention.
There is no doubt that the all the East Asian Tigers had very equitable income distributions while
countries in Latin America and elsewhere which did not experience high growth rates were plagued
with problems of inequality. Faced with high income inequality, politicians have an incentive to
redistribute resources and adopt populist measures. Under these circumstances, capital controls is
one of the many tools that governments have at their disposal to abuse. Countries that have high
degrees of ethnic polarization may also exhibit high degrees of income inequality to the extent that
the distribution of wealth is skewed with one group having a disproportionately higher share. Table
8 presents the results when ELH is substituted by income distribution. The variable for income
distribution is the share of the middle class in 1975. Motivated by Perotti (1996), this is constructed
by adding the shares of income going to the third and the fourth quintile of the population. The
data for these measures come from the new dataset compliled by Deninger and Squire (1996). The
number of countries for which “acceptable quality” income distribution data exists is very few.
Following Barro (2000), Ialso included countries those that were excluded by Deninger and Squire
but did have a national coverage. Despite this the sample of countries is extremely limited and
regressions could be run for only 36 countries using CAPCON1 (37 using CAPCON2).
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 8 suggest that all three variables - capital controls, the interaction
23Though excluded from the sample in Tables 7A and 7B, using the estimated coeﬃcient suggest that Korea had
a high enough level of human capital to derive a net positive eﬀect from capital controls.
23term and MID75 are insigniﬁcant.24 Further capital controls now has a positive sign and a larger
middle class seems to imply a negative eﬀect on growth. One reason why these perverse results could
appear is because capital controls have a correlation of approximately 0.95 with their respective
interaction terms. In Columns (3) and (4), the capital controls term is dropped. This improves the
results somewhat. In the case of CAPCON1, higher income equality does improve the eﬀects of
capital controls on growth but it is not signiﬁcant. For CAPCON2, the result is more encouraging
with the interaction term signiﬁcant at 10%. However this is not very robust. Also disturbing is the
fact that a more equal income distribution seems to imply a negative eﬀect on long run economic
growth. This result is not new. Forbes (2000) has shown this to be true using Gini coeﬃcients
from the same data source in a panel estimation.25 In conclusion, it is not surprising that eﬀect of
the interaction between income distribution and capital controls remains unconvincing given the
limited sample size. In the sample of 37 countries there are only 2 sub-Saharan African nations,
Gabon (with a per capita income not too diﬀerent from Turkey) and Zambia, and as many as 15
OECD nations.
5 Conclusion
Existing empirical research suggests no signiﬁcant relationship between capital account liberal-
ization and economic growth. This has led to questioning the usefulness of opening the capital
account. This paper shows that on deeper examination, capital controls do have an important
eﬀect on economic growth. As with any other government intervention the success or failure of
capital controls depends crucially on some underlying factors. One such important condition turns
out to be the level of ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity in society to that extent that it might
proxy for a measure of the the number of interest groups in society. Depending on a country’s
degree of heterogeneity, capital controls can have negative or positive eﬀects. For countries with
high degrees of heterogeneity, capital controls leads to greater ineﬃciencies and lower economic
growth. It is not therefore surprising that many economists and policy makers oppose controls
because they tend to promote rent-seeking. At the same time, for countries which did not have
24The education variable is dropped from the set of independent variables because theoretically it has been shown
that a more equal income distribution allows for higher levels of human capital accumulation.
25All the regressions in Table 8 were repeated using the Gini coeﬃcient for 1975 from the Deninger and Squire
dataset. The conclusions, including the negative eﬀect of of a more equal income distribution, remained unaltered.
24such heterogeneity, it was shown that capital controls worked to enhance economic growth. On
balance, it turns out that within the sample of non OECD countries which were used for estimation
and which had some capital controls in place, as many as 39 had a net negative eﬀect of capital
controls on growth and only 18 had a net positive eﬀect.
If one uses the coeﬃcients estimated in Table 4 and applies them to countries that could not
be used for estimation but for which data on capital controls and ethno-linguistic homogeneity are
available, the division becomes even more unbalanced. Another 32 non OECD countries experienced
a net negative eﬀect from capital controls taking the total number of countries with a net negative
eﬀect to 71 (out of 99).26 Looking at education and income distribution there was some indication
of similar results but not as robust.
These ﬁndings imply that one needs to take a more nuanced view of the way policies tend to
work instead of expecting to ﬁnd a direct negative or positive eﬀect. The inferences are all the
more interesting given the fact that the data that was used provided fairly limited information.
Further, the applicability of the theoretical model adopted here and also the empirical speciﬁcation,
need not only be restricted to capital controls. It provides a useful method of looking at which
underlying conditions help government intervention in achieving its results and which ones cause
governments to fail.
26These 32 countries were not included in the estimation because either data on growth rates, initial GDPper
capita, education or institutional quality were not available.
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Table 1 
Correlations between Capital Control Indices
28 
 
C17680  C18185  C18690  C19195  C275 C280 C285 C290 C295 C17595 C27595 
C17680  1          
79          
            
C18185  0.7231 1         
79  82         
            
C18690  0.6184  0.8354 1       
79  82  83       
            
C19195  0.5823  0.6776  0.8422 1     
79  82  83  84     
            
C275  0.718 0.5789 0.5052 0.5032  1      
76 79 79 80  82      
            
C280  0.708 0.5259 0.4642 0.4733  0.9282 1      
76 79 79 80  82 82      
            
C285  0.6102 0.6178 0.5077 0.5057  0.7617 0.8457 1     
76 79 79 80  82 82 82     
            
C290  0.5317 0.5873 0.5709 0.6597  0.6155 0.6496 0.7233  1   
76 79 79 80  82 82 82  82   
            
C295  0.3664 0.4268 0.4441 0.5852  0.4282 0.4107 0.4605  0.7276  1 
76  79  79  80 82 82 82 82 82 
            
C17595  0.8212  0.9101  0.9315  0.8809 0.6593 0.6198 0.6411 0.6696 0.5249  1
79  81  81  81 79 79 79 79 79  82
            
C27595  0.6965 0.6478 0.5909 0.6479 0.874 0.8985 0.89  0.8782  0.7136 0.7355 1
76  79  79  80 82 82 82 82 82  79 82











                                                           
28 C1 refers to CAPCON1 and C2 refers to CAPCON2. The number below each correlation refers to the no. 
of observations   33  
Table 2 
Correlation between Capital Control Indicators  
And Measures of International Flows
29. 
 








  All Countries  All Countries  Non OECD  Non OECD 
















GROSS FDI FLOWS/GDP  -0.54 



















































                                                           
29 Data for these come from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) and the World Bank Indicators 
(WBI). Portfolio capital inflows and outflows are respectively what the IFS more precisely calls Portfolio 
Investment Liabilities and Portfolio Investment Assets (note that any capital inflow is a liability for the 
recipient country). The financial account balance in the IFS is the sum of the balance of direct investment 
(mostly FDI), portfolio investment, other investment transactions and financial derivatives. Gross private 
capital flows (taken from WBI) are the sum of the absolute values of direct, portfolio, and other investment 
inflows and outflows recorded in the balance of payments financial account, excluding changes in the 
assets and liabilities of monetary authorities and general government. Current account balance (WBI) is the 
sum of net exports of goods, services, net income, and net current transfers. 
The first number in the parentheses is the significance and the second number is the sample of countries for 
which this correlation was available.   34  
Table 3 
Capital Controls and Long Run Growth
30 
(Dependent Variable: Growth Rate per Capita 1976-95) 
 
  1 2  3  4  5  6 













































































East Asian  
Dummy 








            
Observations  116 105  80  81 61  61 
R-Square  0.04 0.04  0.56  0.56  0.64  0.65 
 
                                                           
30 The first number in each cell is the coefficient and the second number is the t-ratio. * : significant at 
10%, **: significant at 5%, ***: significant at 1%.   35  
Table 4 
Capital Controls (CAPCON), Ethnic Homogeneity and Economic Growth 
(Dependent Variable: Growth Rate per Capita 1976-95) 
 
  1 2 3 4  5  6  7 8 












No HKG  
& TWN 
No HKG  
 & TWN 


























































































































































             
Obsvns.  82 82 82 82  62  62  80 80 
R-Square  0.63 0.62 0.65 0.66  0.71  0.72  0.63 0.64   36  
Table 5 
Net Effect of Capital Controls on Growth 
 
Top Ten with Positive Effects   Top Ten with Negative Effects 
 
 
Name   CAPCON1  Net Effect Based 
on CAPCON1 
Name  CAPCON1  Net effect Based 
on CAPCON1 
Bangladesh 1  0.68 Tanzania 1  -3.28 
Korea, Rep.  1  0.68 Congo, Dem. Rep.  1  -3.20 
Dominican Republic  1  0.63 Cameroon  1  -3.11 
Jamaica 1  0.62 Guinea-Bissau  1  -3.10 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  1  0.57 Uganda  1  -3.03 
Jordan 1  0.54 South  Africa  1  -3.01 
Chile 1  0.45 Zambia  1  -3.01 
El Salvador  1  0.45 Kenya  1  -2.99 
Brazil 1  0.43 Sierra  Leone  1  -2.93 
Colombia 1  0.43 Senegal  1  -2.78 
 
 
Name   CAPCON2  Net Effect Based 
on CAPCON2 
Name  CAPCON2  Net effect Based 
on CAPCON2 
Bangladesh  1  1.04  Congo, Dem. Rep.  1  -4.15863
Korea, Rep.  0.8  0.83  Cameroon  1  -4.03819
Dominican Republic  0.8  0.78  Guinea-Bissau  1  -4.026
Jamaica 0.8  0.77  Uganda  1  -3.94131
Brazil 1  0.70  South  Africa  1  -3.91265
Jordan 0.8  0.69  Zambia 1  -3.90321
Colombia 0.9  0.63  Tanzania  0.9  -3.83928
Tunisia 1  0.62  Mali  1  -3.77907
El Salvador  0.8  0.58  Papua New Guinea  1  -3.74425
Syrian Arab Republic  0.6  0.28  Senegal  1  -3.60205  37  
 
Table 6A 
Robustness Results for CAPCON1 and Ethno-Linguistic Homogeneity 
(Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of GDP per cap 1975-95) 
(Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan Excluded from Sample) 
 
  0 1  2 3 4 5 




































LogINV7595   1.18 
1.62 
    
INF7595     -0.001 
-4.22*** 
   
Life Ex. 
1975 
   0.11 
3.25*** 
   
RGHT 7595      0.07 
0.09 
  
CIV 7595      0.02 
0.72 
  
TRADEVOL       0.71 
1.09 
 
LLY7590        5.80 
0.68 
Observations  78 69  73 58 76 61 
R-Square  0.56 0.58  0.72 0.61 0.58 0.61 
 
In each of these regressions, the following variables were also included : Log of GDP pc 
1975, SYR7595, INSTTN, Latin America Dummy, Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy, East 
Asia Dummy. 
 
   38  
Table 6B 
Robustness Results for CAPCON2 and Ethno-Linguistic Homogeneity 
(Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of GDP per cap 1975-95) 
(Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan Excluded from Sample) 
 
  0 1 2 3 4  5 




































LogINV7595   1.05 
1.48 
    
INF7595    -0.001 
-3.95*** 
   
Life Ex. 
1975 
  0.08 
2.40** 
   
RGHT 7595     0.02 
0.23 
  
CIV 7595     -1.07 
-0.49 
  
TRADEVOL      -0.01 
-1.65 
 
LLY7590       0.40 
0.54 
Observations  0.58 0.59 0.7  0.63 0.60 0.66 
R-Square  78 70 73 59 74 60 
 
In each of these regressions, the following variables were also included : Log of GDP pc 
1975, SYR7595, INSTTN, Latin America Dummy, Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy, East 
Asia Dummy. 
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Table 7A 
Robustness Results for CAPCON1 and Education 
(Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of GDP per cap 1975-95) 
(Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan Excluded from Sample) 
 
  0 1  2  3  4  5 






































LogINV7595   1.52 
2.06** 
     
INF7595    -0.001 
-3.99*** 
    
Life Ex. 
1975 
  0.10 
3.01*** 
    
RGHT 7595      -0.04 
-0.41 
  
CIV 7595      -0.0006 
-0.003 
  
TRADEVOL        -0.005 
-0.86 
 
LLY7590          0.96 
1.07 
Observations  78  69  73 58 74  61 
R-Square  0.51  0.55  0.67 0.58 0.54  0.55 
 
In each of these regressions, the following variables were also included: Log of GDP pc 
1975, INSTTN, Latin America Dummy, Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy and East Asia 
Dummy. 
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Table 7B 
Robustness Results for CAPCON2 and Education 
(Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of GDP per cap 1975-95) 
(Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan Excluded from Sample) 
 
  0  1 2 3  4  5 




































LogINV7595   1.45 
1.96* 
      
INF7595    -0.001 
-3.77*** 
   
Life Ex. 
1975 
  0.09 
2.47** 
   
RGHT 7595      -0.04 
-0.39 
  
CIV 7595      -0.02 
-0.06 
  
TRADEVOL       -0.005 
-0.96 
 
LLY7590        0.79 
0.97 
Observations  78 70 73  59 74 60 
R-Square  0.50 0.53 0.63  0.51 0.52 0.56 
 
In each of these regressions, the following variables were also included : Log of GDP pc 
1975,  INSTTN, Latin America Dummy, Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy, East Asia 
Dummy. 
   41  
Table 8 
Capital Controls and Income Distribution 
(Dependent Variable : Growth Rate of GDP per cap 1975-95) 
(All countries) 
 
  1 2 3  4  5 
CAPCON1 1.92 
0.57 








CAPCON2   0.77 
0.32 


















         
         
         
Observations  36 37 36  37  37 
R-Square  0.85 0.86 0.85  0.86  0.84 
 
In each of these regressions, the following variables were also included: Log of GDP pc 
1975, INSTTN, Latin America Dummy, Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy, East Asia Dummy. 
The high R-Squares are due to the very high significance of the dummy variables. The 
correlation between CAPCON1 (CAPCON2) and CAPCON1*MID75 
(CAPCON2*MID75) is 0.94 (0.95). 
 